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Roy R. Ray Lecture Series

FREE SPEECH, THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH,
AND THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
Frederick Schauer*
I. INTRODUCTION

A

MONG the more enduring visions of the goal of the First
Amendment’s speech and press clauses,1 and of the very principle of freedom of speech more broadly, is the idea that a regime
of freedom of speech will enable the society within which such a principle
is taken seriously to identify more true propositions, to reject more false
propositions, and thus to facilitate the advance of knowledge within that
society. The idea is sometimes discussed under the heading of the “search
for truth,”2 and even more often as the “marketplace of ideas,”3 but the
basic concept of freedom of speech as enabling a society to increase its
level of knowledge, to facilitate its identification of truth, and to expose
error has a wide and persistent currency. Indeed, in one of the Supreme
Court’s most recent important free speech cases, United States v. Alvarez,4 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion repeated much of the conven-

* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
This Article is the written version of the Roy R. Ray Lecture delivered at the Dedman
School of Law, Southern Methodist University, on April 12, 2017. I am grateful to the
SMU faculty and students for the invitation and for their comments and questions, and to
the support of the family of the late Professor Ellen Solender in the preparation of the final
Article. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the University of Sydney Law
School in November, 2016, and this version is better for the audience comments on that
occasion.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04
(1984); Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953,
1005 (2016); Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 701
(2016); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199,
1217 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Christoph Bezemek,
The Epistemic Neutrality of the “Marketplace of Ideas”: Milton, Mill, Brandeis and Holmes
on Falsehood and Freedom of Speech, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159 (2015); Jared Schroeder, Shifting the Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influences on the Supreme Court’s Use of
the Marketplace Metaphor in Twenty-First Century Free Expression Cases, 21 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 383 (2016); Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8–11
(2016).
4. 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2016),
constituted unconstitutional content discrimination as applied to a candidate for political
office who had falsely claimed, among other false statements, to have been awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor).
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tional marketplace of ideas wisdom,5 punctuated by his observation that
“[t]ruth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”6 And
earlier the Court had signaled a similar theme, announcing in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.7 that “[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas.”8
The search for truth/marketplace of ideas justification for a distinct
principle of freedom of speech has for decades been subject to harsh criticism,9 but, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alvarez shows, the justification persists, both in judicial opinions10 and in the academic
commentary.11 Yet one of the aspects of this particular free speech justification that appears largely to have been ignored is the question of just
whose knowledge is relevant, and, thus, what it is for a society to know
something, or to have discovered truth (or exposed falsity), in a setting in
which the society is comprised of multiple members, each with his, her, or
its own knowledge. If I believe (correctly) that astrology is bunk but you
believe (falsely) that astrology is the key to the universe, what can we say,
if anything, about what you and I know—what we know, collectively—
and about whether we have discovered truth? And the problem is apparent not only in the truncated two person scenario just hypothesized, but
also, and more realistically, for the far larger aggregations of individuals
and entities that we call societies, cultures, or even countries.
My goal in this Article is thus to consider the implications of the problem of collective knowledge for thinking about free speech, for examining
the search for truth as a justification for a free speech regime, and for
contemplating the image of the marketplace of ideas. In settings in which
some people know things that others do not, or in which some people
believe things to be true that others are just as convinced are false, or in
which First Amendment-protected utterances will produce changes of belief in multiple and inconsistent ways, do even the soundest versions of
5. Id. at 727–28.
6. Id. at 729. For commentary on and analysis of Alvarez, see SEANA VALENTINE
SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 120–29 (2014); Alan K.
Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 1435 (2015); Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87
WASH. L. REV. 445 (2012); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
161 (2012).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. Id. at 339–40.
9. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821
(2008); Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV.
951 (1997); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1984). And see also infra Section II.
10. See supra notes 2–3. See also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014);
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524
U.S. 569, 587 (1998); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996); CBS v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 99 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
11. See supra notes 2–3, 9. See also Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free
Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2016); Howard M.
Wasserman, Holmes and Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 798 (2016).
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the marketplace of ideas theory encounter previously unrecognized
problems? My aim here is principally to identify and expose the issue,
leaving definitive conclusions, concrete implications, and normative prescriptions to other people or other times.
II. LOCATING THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH ON
THE FREE SPEECH MAP
Almost a half century ago, Thomas Emerson offered a catalog of foundations for what he called “The System of Freedom of Expression,”12 and
Emerson’s catalog remains a useful guide to free speech theory, even as
subsequent contributions have both added to13 and subdivided his list.
Putting aside the grab bag of pragmatic justifications that Emerson described as “the dynamics of the limitation,”14 three clusters of foundational goals served for Emerson to ground both the idea of freedom of
expression generally and the First Amendment more specifically. One of
these clusters was what Emerson described as individual self-fulfillment,15 and since Emerson’s time a vast array of theories has sought to
explain the importance of freedom of speech in terms of embodying or
fostering what others have variously described as self-realization,16 self-

12. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–20 (1970).
Emerson’s book builds on his earlier Thomas I. Emerson, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966), which in turn is a revision of Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
13. See, e.g, LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (tolerance); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999) (dissent); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990) (same); Vincent Blasi, The First
Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988) (civic and intellectual courage); Vincent Blasi,
Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567 (1999) (same); Vincent Blasi,
Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 62 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2002) (same); Paul Horwitz, Citizenship and Speech, 43 MCGILL L. J. 445 (1998) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996)) (same).
14. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 9–11. Many of the concerns that Emerson includes
within his “dynamics of the limitation” idea are those that are sometimes discussed under
“distrust of government” justifications for the First Amendment. See, e.g., Abner S.
Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68 ALA. L. REV.
337, 380 (2016); Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and
Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1777 (2009); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust:
Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1347 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 111 (1998).
15. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 6.
16. See Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1465, 1473 (2016); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 591 (1982); Mark Tushnet, New York Times v. Sullivan Around the World, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 337, 342 n.36 (2014).
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expression,17 liberty,18 dignity,19 individuality,20 or autonomy.21
Other theorists, sometimes rejecting the autonomy/liberty foundations22 for freedom of speech and sometimes seeking only to supplement
them, have attempted to locate the idea of freedom of speech in an account of democracy, arguing in one way or another that a regime of free
speech either facilitates democracy or is, definitionally,23 a component of
democratic governance.24 Sometimes this value is located in the view that
17. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); United States v. Alvarez, 638
F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); Sonja
R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 53-54 (2016).
18. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1977); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); Jan Narveson, Freedom of Speech and Expression: A Libertarian
View, in FREE EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 59 (W.J. Waluchow ed.
1994); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
19. See Guy E. Carmi, Dignity versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free
Speech, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 277 (2008); Guy E. Carmi, Dignity—The Enemy from Within: A
Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957 (2007); Adrienne Stone, Defamation of Public Figures: North
American Contrasts, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 24 (2005).
20. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 9-10 (1992); Richard
Moon, The Supreme Court of Canada on the Structure of Freedom of Expression Adjudication, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 419, 419 (1995).
21. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMM. 251
(2011); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994);
Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 225, 233 (1992); Seana Valentin Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of
Speech, 27 CONST. COMM. 283 (2011); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST.
COMM. 417 (2011); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991). Among the leading proponents of an autonomy-based justification, particularly one premised on listener autonomy, has been Thomas Scanlon, T.M.
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972), but Scanlon
now (properly, in my view) doubts that arguments from autonomy can distinguish free
speech anti-paternalism from anti-paternalism more generally. See T.M. Scanlon, Comment
on Baker’s Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMM. 319, 322 n.11 (2011).
22. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971). See also Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Frank
Morrow, Speech, Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235 (1975).
23. One might, that is, define democracy independent of the question of free speech—
as being about majority rule, for example—but then posit that freedom of speech, instrumentally, will either make democracy more effective, or more likely to be accepted, or
more resistant to anti-democratic pressures. Or one might, instead, simply take freedom of
speech as a component of the definition of democracy, such that a society with less freedom of speech is, for that reason, less democratic. Although the issue is orthogonal to the
principal theme of this Article, the contrast between instrumental and definitional understandings of the relationship between freedom of speech and democracy does suggest a
connection between democratic justifications for freedom of speech and the academic literature contrasting intrinsic with instrumental accounts of democracy itself. See CHARLES
BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1989); THOMAS
CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF MANY (1996); WILLIAM NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY
(1980).
24. See, most prominently, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). For applications of
Meiklejohn’s ideas, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The
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decisions in a democracy must be made by the people and not their representatives,25 and at other times the emphasis is on the importance in a
democracy of constraining—checking—the power of government,26 but
the basic idea is that freedom of speech serves functions in a democracy
that are both dependent upon and derivative of the basic idea of government as subservient to and responsible to the population at large.
Alongside these justifications, and in important respects more longstanding, is the idea that freedom of speech serves as an effective mechanism for locating truth, for identifying and expunging falsity, and for
increasing the stock of human knowledge.27 Under one conception of this
idea, a conception most directly located in Oliver Wendell Holmes’s enduring claim that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,”28 the competition of
propositions in the marketplace of ideas is truth-defining, in the sense that
truth is to be understood or defined as that which in fact survives in the
marketplace of ideas. Just as strong free market proponents understand
“value” as a market-defined idea, such that that which succeeds in the
market is for that reason valuable, so too might Holmes be understood as
Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191; William Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1965). For variations on the basic theme of freedom of speech as grounded in a
conception of democracy, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 1097 (2016); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (2012); Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy as a
Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617 (2011); Martin H. Redish & Abby
Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303 (2009);
James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST.
COMM. 361 (2011); James Weinstein, Extreme Speech, Public Order, and Democracy: Lessons from the Masses, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 23 (Ivan Hare & James
Weinstein eds. 2009). A useful critique is C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for
a Free Speech Principle? 97 VA. L. REV. 515 (2011).
25. See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra
note 24; ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2014); Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply,
supra note 24. Post, as well as Weinstein (supra note 25), stress the importance of democracy to the citizen-participant rather than to the collective decision, which makes their
account differ from Meiklejohn’s and others, but exploring these differences is not germane to the focus of this Article.
26. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977). See also Michael Schudson, Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION 73 (Timothy E.
Cook ed. 2005). The checking value might also be valuable in non-democratic societies, as
long as excess concentration of power is deemed to be dangerous even apart from the way
in which it would interfere with popular sovereignty.
27. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–34 (1982);
Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55
(2015).
28. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). An
important historical account is THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICA (2013). See also SHELDON NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 331 (1989).
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making a similar claim about truth, such that the ideas that survive in the
marketplace of ideas are, for that reason, those that we choose to designate as “true.” But although such a conception of truth might be consistent with Holmes’s own partly (and sometimes) skeptical and partly (and
sometimes) pragmatic philosophical commitments,29 and might be plausible as simply a way of expressing the idea that matters of political (and
policy) truth in a democracy ought to be decided by the people,30 that
conception is implausible in the context of factual, scientific, and other
ideas—including many moral ones—in which there is a conception of
truth that is independent of what the marketplace of ideas at any particular time may happen to accept.31 The earth was round even when almost
all people thought it flat, the propositions of phrenology32 and astrology
had no more scientific empirical grounding when and where people have
taken them to be true than they do now, and the moral wrongness of Nazi
ideology is neither historically nor culturally contingent.33 Insofar as the
claims about the marketplace of ideas are understood as globally truthdefining, those claims are either extremely narrow in application, being
limited to truths of a certain kind, or else they are largely false, or, perhaps, they are both.34
Considerably more plausible, therefore, is an understanding of the “argument from truth”35 that understands freedom of speech not as truthdefining but as truth-locating. That is, if we adopt for some, many, or most
propositions the view that their truth (or falsity) is a property existing
independent of and logically antecedent to the process or mechanism that
might be employed to identify those truths, then the argument is now that
freedom of speech is the best method of locating those independentlydefined truths or is at least a method for doing so that it is superior to any
29. See generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK,
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000); ALLEN MENDENHALL, OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., PRAGMATISM, AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AGON: AESTHETIC DISSENT AND
THE COMMON LAW (2017); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 787 (1989); Patrick J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist? Reflections on a New Twist
to an Old Argument, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 427 (1990); Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31
U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964); Catharine P. Wells, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541
(1988).
30. See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1
(2004). See also Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897,
910 (2010).
31. See Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 665–83 (1987).
32. On phrenology, the now completely discredited so-called science of assessing a
person’s personality by the shape of his or her skull, see R.J. Cooter, Phrenology: The
Provocation of Progress, 14 HIST. SCI. 211 (1976).
33. “[T]he theory of the truth of the marketplace, determined ultimately by a count of
noses—this total relativism—cannot be the theory of our Constitution.” ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 77 (1975).
34. See Schauer, supra note 27, at 20–22; Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing
the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 1166–67 (2015).
35. Schauer, supra note 27, at 15–34.
AND
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or most other available alternative methods.36 This idea of freedom of
speech as truth-locating is the basic concept expressed long ago by John
Milton when he asked, rhetorically, in the Areopagitica, “Who ever knew
Truth put to the worst, in a free and open encounter?,”37 and it is the
foundation for many of the arguments in chapter 2 of John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty,38 in Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies,39 and
in numerous other contributions to free speech theory40 and constitutional doctrine.41 Freedom of speech under this argument does not define
truth but is thought to provide a comparatively reliable social mechanism
for identifying error, for locating truth, and thus, in the aggregate, for
advancing social knowledge.42
Understood in this way, as a claim about the comparative (compared
to, say, expert or authoritative selection) reliability of a particular institutional design in advancing knowledge, the argument from truth is revealed as substantially empirical, its philosophical provenance
notwithstanding.43 Whether this or that method for identification of independently defined truth will locate more truths, or expose more falsehoods, when compared to some other method having the same goal is not
nearly as much a philosophical (or legal) question as it is a testable, empirical one.44 And as a testable, empirical proposition, it turns out that
there are good reasons to doubt the soundness of the empirical claim.45
36. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1138–61 (1983).
37. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 126 (J.C. Suffolk ed., University Tutorial Press,
1968) (1644). See Vincent Blasi, The Elliot Lecture: Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern
First Amendment, in IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47 (Vincent Blasi ed., 2d ed. 2012).
38. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., Norton 1975) (1859).
39. KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966).
40. E.g., Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed LegalPolitical Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956); William P. Marshall, In
Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1
(1995); Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011).
41. The idea surfaces prominently in, for example, Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n,
551 U.S. 177, 179 (2007); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965).
42. See also Benjamin S. DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth:
Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 161 (1972).
43. One can imagine a genuinely controlled experiment designed to focus on evaluating different decision procedures for identifying truth, but to the best of my knowledge no
such experiments have in fact been conducted.
44. And perhaps we have Mill and his philosophical talents to blame for the fact that
the questions he raised remain understood as far more philosophical than empirical.
45. See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 128–30
(2005). As Alexander discusses, many environments—academic inquiry and publication,
for example—often act on the assumption that the pursuit of truth is best pursued in highly
regulated and structured discursive environments. See also Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemic
Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society, 88 J. PHIL. 113 (1991); Alvin I.
Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY
1 (1996); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 163–64 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). And on the effects of potential market failure in the

238

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

More specifically, if we understand the question as one about which
properties of a proposition will cause it to be accepted by some individual
or group, there is scant empirical support for the view that the truth of a
proposition has a greater causal effect on acceptance than, say, the charisma or authority or status of the speaker, the frequency with which the
proposition is expressed,46 the way (including technology) in which the
proposition is expressed, the prior beliefs and prejudices of the hearer,
the pragmatic (or psychological or emotional) value to the hearer of the
proposition being true, and much more.47 If the venerable claim for the
marketplace of ideas is thus understood as a comparative claim about the
value of that method compared to others for locating truth and thus increasing social knowledge, there are good reasons to be considerably
more skeptical about the claim than standard free speech theory and
ubiquitous civil libertarian (and judicial48) rhetoric seems typically to
appreciate.
III. THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE
Although there are many good reasons to be skeptical of the marketplace of ideas/search for truth family of justifications for the First Amendment and for a principle of freedom of speech more broadly,49 there are
also good reasons to be skeptical of the skepticism. Human cognition and
human rationality have their pathologies, but so too do expert processes,
and perhaps especially governmental processes.50 If the empirical claim
of the marketplace of ideas account is understood, as it should be, as a
comparative one, the question is not whether the marketplace of ideas is
good at locating truth and advancing human knowledge, but, rather,
whether it is better at doing so than a committee of experts, an agency of
marketplace of ideas, see Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas:
Commercial Speech and the Problem That Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181
(2007).
46. Or, especially in the age of the Internet, the frequency with which a proposition is
repeated or transmitted.
47. Much of the social science research, largely from social psychology, bearing on this
issue is summarized and cited in Ho & Schauer, supra note 35, at 1168–72. And for the
partly empirical and partly theoretical perspective from economics, see, for example, Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
See also Blasi, supra note 30, at 4–13; Albert Breton & Ronald Wintrobe, Freedom of
Speech vs. Efficient Regulation in Markets for Ideas, 17 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 217
(1992).
48. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
49. And perhaps especially in the context of verifiable factual propositions. See
Schauer, supra note 30; Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact, Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 11-02 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=17
37930.
50. I say “perhaps” because the claim is a tricky one. Although there are reasons to
distrust experts, reasons to distrust aggregations of experts, and reasons to distrust government, it is not so clear that aggregations of government experts, such as those who inhabit
regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration and the National Traffic
Safety Board, are to be more distrusted because of their governmental status than are
otherwise similar collections of similar experts outside of the public sector.
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bureaucrats, or a hierarchy of powerful (and often self-interested51) public officials. Here, the directly applicable social science research, other
than the anecdotal, is largely non-existent,52 and as such there is not very
much that can be said definitively about the marketplace claim if properly
understood as a comparative one. As current controversies about climate
change (and, to a lesser extent, the alleged harms of immunization and
genetically modified foods) indicate, even many factual and scientific issues are so caught up in contested politics that it is difficult to place very
much confidence in the most obvious alternatives to an open marketplace
of ideas.53
As a result of these uncertainties and complications, in this Article I
simply assume that there is at least some soundness in the comparative
empirical claims that lie behind standard marketplace of ideas theory.
That is, I will assume that there is some reason, in some contexts and on
some subjects, to believe that something resembling an unrestricted clash
of facts, ideas, and opinions will at times be more likely to tend toward
the identification of truth, independently defined, then will some number
of other approaches, institutions, and methods, especially those associated with government or other powerful and self-interested truth-determiners. But even with this assumption in place, problems and issues
remain, one of which is my focus here. Specifically, even if we assume
that the goal is the advancement of knowledge, and even if we assume
that one lone individual can know something at Time Two that she did
not know at Time One, what is it for a collection of individuals to know
something at Time Two that the collection did not know at Time One? To
put the same question more directly, what is it for a collection of individuals to know something?54 These are difficult questions, but their diffi51. And if, as is so often claimed, governmental officials are infected with a pervasive
self-interest, then we should not quickly dismiss the possibility of the same for groups of
experts.
52. As an example, however, it is worth noting that the pathology of overconfidence in
judgments is as great, and perhaps greater, for experts than it is for non-experts. See, e.g.,
Markus Glaser, Thomas Langer, & Martin Weber, True Overconfidence of Professionals
and Lay People: Individual Differences Within and Between Tasks, BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING (2011); Leilani Greening & Carla C. Chandler, Why It Can’t Happen to Me: The
Base Rate Matters, but Overestimating Skill Leads to Underestimating Risk, 27 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCH. 760 (1997). See, more generally, but supporting the same point, Ethan Zell &
Zlatan Krizan, Do People Have Insight Into Their Abilities? A Metasynthesis, 9 PERSP. ON
PSYCH. SCI. 111 (2014). Much earlier, John Stuart Mill had speculated about the same
phenomenon: “Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference,
usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects.” Mill,
supra note 38, at 19.
53. On the kinds of political, psychological, and sociological distortions that might lead
to at least some degree of distrust of organized expertise and organized science, see SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1997).
54. I will note but not discuss the potentially relevant scholarship on the subject of
whether there can be a collective legislative intent. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally
Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 542–44 (2016); John F. Manning,
Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (2015). In some respects the problems
are similar in the sense that the complexities that bedevil attempts to say that this is the
intention of a multi-member body (such as Congress, or a multi-member court) are related

240

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

culty does not make them any less important. Without knowing how a
group can know something, we cannot know how a group can know
something that it did not know previously. And without knowing how a
group can know more (or less) than it did previously, we cannot know
how to assess to growth of human knowledge, which is, after all, the ultimate goal of any version of the search for truth/marketplace of ideas
account.
The question I address here, the question of group knowledge, has, it
turns out, been the subject of considerable recent philosophical interest,
even if not in the specific context of freedom of speech. Traditionally, that
branch of philosophy understood as epistemology—the philosophical understanding of knowledge—has focused on single individuals. In asking
questions such as what it is to know something, whether one knows something that is in fact true if one does not have justifications for that true
belief, whether one knows something if one has a justified belief in something that turns out to be untrue, whether one knows something if one
has a justified belief in something that turns out not to be true, and so on,
traditional epistemology has, historically, focused almost entirely on the
single individual.55
More recently, however, epistemology has expanded its focus. Following on the influential “social epistemology” of Alvin Goldman,56 an increasing number of philosophers have turned to fascinating and
important questions of “group belief,”57 or, more broadly, collective
knowledge.58 But although this scholarship represents an important
breakthrough in the study of epistemology and addresses numerous questions as significant as they are deep and novel, the focus, as with traditional individualist epistemology, has largely been on what it is for a
group to be justified in some belief, or what it is for a group to believe
something, and not very much on the actual existence of true beliefs for a
group, independent of whether the beliefs are justified, and independent
of whether the beliefs actually count as beliefs in some deeper philosophical sense.
to the difficulties surrounding efforts to attribute a determination of truth or belief to a
multi-member population. But in other respects, the problems are different because the
legislative intent problem stems from the alleged necessity and alleged difficulty of identifying a single intention, but those problems are not the ones that arise when we are trying
to think about the advance of knowledge or the identification of truth by a multi-member
population.
55. See, e.g., RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (2d ed. 1977); D.W.
HAMLYN, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1970).
56. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999).
57. See Jennifer Lackey, What is Justified Group Belief? 125 PHIL. REV. 341 (2016).
58. See, e.g., THE EPISTEMIC LIVES OF GROUPS: ESSAYS IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF
COLLECTIVES (Michael S. Brady & Miranda Fricker eds., 2016); ESSAYS IN COLLECTIVE
EPISTEMOLOGY (Jennifer Lackey ed., 2014); COLLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY (Hans Bernhard
Schmid, Daniel Sirtes, & Marcel Weber eds., 2011); Margaret Gilbert, Collective Epistemology, 1 EPISTEME 95 (2004); Frederick S. Schmitt, The Justification of Group Belief, in
SOCIALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY: THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 257 (1994); Symposium, Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers, 21 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 209
(2007); Raimo Tuomela, Group Knowledge Analyzed, 1 EPISTEME 109 (2004).
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All this is not to denigrate this profoundly interesting and deeply important area of relatively recent philosophical scholarship. It is, however,
to suggest that the philosophical scholarship on the question of collective
belief may not address directly the kinds of questions that are most relevant to the legal and political questions surrounding the concept and operation of the marketplace of ideas and to the view that the search for
truth is a substantial justification for the principle of freedom of speech as
it exists in most open and democratic developed nations. For that purpose, although prompted by the philosophical literature, we need to examine the issue from a slightly different direction. And thus it may be
useful to formulate a simple and stylized example.
Suppose, therefore, that there is a society (or group of any kind) consisting of 100 people. And suppose that at some time—Time One—
twenty of those people believe P, and that this belief is true. In other
words, P is true. And then suppose further that for the same group at the
same time ten people believe, falsely, that P is not true. They mistakenly
believe not-P. And finally, suppose that the remaining seventy members
of this population have no beliefs at all—no beliefs one way or another—
in the question of P.
Now that we have described the baseline or initial array of beliefs
about the question of P, assume that there is then some degree of speech
about P. And after this public (or group-wide, or group-accessible)
speech about P takes place, assume we then try to describe the beliefs of
the group about P. Now, after some degree of speech about P—at Time
Two—it turns out that in the same society (or, for that matter, in another
society59), forty people now correctly believe P, thirty people now falsely
believe not-P, and another thirty still have no beliefs at all on the subject
of P.60
The question presented by this stylized example should now be obvious. Is this society epistemologically better off at Time Two than at Time
One because more people have the correct belief in P at Time Two than
had it at Time One? Or is the society epistemologically worse off at Time
Two than at Time One because more people have the false belief—notP—at Time Two than had it at Time One? My point, which I will explore
in greater detail presently, is simply that on this information alone we
cannot answer these questions.
The same issue and the same problems arise if we are thinking not
about the array of beliefs on a single topic or proposition, but instead
about beliefs on multiple topics or multiple propositions. So now assume
59. My concern here is with the issue of comparison, and thus, analytically, it makes
no difference whether we are comparing one society at different times or instead comparing two different societies.
60. I have previously used this example in a footnote to an article on a different topic,
and the present Article can be considered as an expansion of what was previously no more
than this one footnote. Frederick Schauer, Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the
Post-Millian Calculus, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING
REGULATION AND RESPONSES 129, 136 n.23 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012).
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that at Time One this society, or some other society, has some number—
X—beliefs, and that some smaller number of those beliefs—N—are true.
And assume as well that the same society also has some number—n—of
false beliefs at Time One. X is the total number of beliefs in the society,
and X is the sum of the society’s true beliefs—N—and false beliefs—n.
But now, what if at Time Two the society has X + Y beliefs, consisting of
N + N’ true beliefs but also n + n’ false beliefs. Similarly, therefore, is the
society better off for having more true beliefs at Time Two than it had at
Time One, or is it worse off for having more false beliefs at Time Two
than it had at Time One? Is a society with more true beliefs epistemologically better off with more true beliefs, or is it better off with fewer false
beliefs, and what is the trade-off if more true beliefs, as in the example,
are accompanied by more false beliefs?61
My main point here is to suggest that without knowing more about the
nature of P (in the first example), about the relationship between P and
the spread of belief in P and not-P, and the about consequences of believing P and of believing not-P, we simply cannot answer these questions.
And so too with the second scenario, dealing with the question of aggregate beliefs about multiple subjects or multiple propositions. And I want
to suggest further that the answers to these questions go to the heart of
the search for truth/marketplace of ideas justifications for freedom of
speech in ways that have not traditionally been recognized, but which are,
as I explore in the following section, in need of further analysis and
examination.
IV. COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND THE
SPREAD OF BELIEF
The particular problem of collective knowledge as an epistemological
problem has been almost completely absent from the search-for-truth
literature on freedom of speech, but that literature, and especially the
profoundly influential arguments of John Stuart Mill, nevertheless appears to have assumed a series of answers to the questions posed in the
previous section. That is, Mill and others seem implicitly to have assumed
that any society with more beliefs in the truth, or with beliefs in more
truths, is better, certainly epistemologically and perhaps in total, than a
society with fewer beliefs in truth, or with beliefs in fewer truths.62
61. An assumption here is that discussion of some proposition has the potential of
increasing not only true beliefs about that proposition but false beliefs as well. This is
implicit not only in all that psychology has told us about the psychology of belief formation, as set out in the various sources cited in Ho & Schauer, supra note 35, but also in
common sense experience. If the number of people hearing that Barack Obama was born
in Hawaii increases, presumably the number of people believing that he was born in Hawaii will increase as well. But if for all of the reasons discussed above some people may on
some topics be resistant to true propositions, see supra text accompanying notes 30–43, the
restatement of that which is true may also have the unintended side effect of increasing the
number of people who believe in a false proposition.
62. If Mill is genuinely a thoroughgoing utilitarian, and especially an act-utilitarian,
then the utility of gaining more knowledge must enter into a more complex calculus includ-
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Lurking behind these assumptions appears to be a series of further assumptions about the acceptance of truth and about the consequences of
falsity. To take my first stylized example above, the one in which people
have different views about the truth or falsity of a single proposition, one
way of concluding that a society with more people believing a true proposition is better off than a society with fewer people believing it, without
regard to the number of people mistakenly believing in the negation, is to
challenge the example by saying that the conditions that would increase
the frequency of belief in (true) P from Time One to Time Two are conditions that simply could not increase the frequency of false (not-P) beliefs
for any segment of a population exposed to the same stimuli as those that
increased the frequency of true belief. If one believes that the truth of a
proposition is the dominant factor in explaining why people believe a
proposition, then there is no possibility that exposing people to the truth
of a proposition would increase the number of people who believed to
the contrary. And this of course is just a cumbersome and abstract way of
saying what Milton said almost four hundred years ago,63 and what some
number of other theorists, judges, citizens, and activists in what broadly
might be considered the Rationalist or Enlightenment traditions64 have
been saying ever since. If truth has some intrinsic power enabling it to
prevail against untrue beliefs, or if human beings have some intrinsic capacity of reason that enables them to identify true propositions and reject
false ones when actual evidence and arguments are presented to them,
then there is little possibility that the circulation of true propositions, esing many other utility-enhancing and utility-detracting elements. If Mill is instead understood as a proto-rule-utilitarian, see J.O. Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral
Philosophy of J.S. Mill, 3 PHIL. Q. 33 (1953), then perhaps one of the rules would be a rule
to maximize truth, not as an end in itself, but a rule which, if followed on all occasions,
would maximize utility. But if Mill, some of his other writings notwithstanding (JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861)), is not genuinely a utilitarian at all, then he may be
understood as valuing truth, liberty, and individuality (or one or two of those three) as
ends in themselves and not as merely instrumental to utility-maximization. The issue of
whether Mill was genuinely a utilitarian, or whether the Mill of On Liberty was genuinely a
utilitarian, has interested scholars for generation. See generally MAURICE COWLING, MILL
AND LIBERALISM (1963); JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY (1983); ALAN RYAN, JOHN STUART MILL (1970); C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY (1980); Vincent Blasi, Shouting “Fire!” in a
Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 535 (2011). Apart from questions
about Mill’s deepest philosophical commitments and utilitarian bona fides, however, On
Liberty seems to presuppose the enormously important value of truth. But even apart from
the question whether that claim is based on truth as ultimate or instead as being merely
instrumental, the claim is hardly, as much of our law about the invasion of privacy makes
clear, self-evidently correct. See Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699 (1991). See also Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Why Tolerate? Reflections on the Millian Truth Principle, 25 PHILOSOPHIA 131, 146–47 (1997).
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
64. Among virtually countless accounts and analyses of the Enlightenment as a historical period and as a revolution based on “principles of human reason,” see ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelnn & James Pettegrove
trans., 1955) (1932); LOUIS DUPRÉ, THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN CULTURE (2004); William Bristow, Enlightenment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 20, 2010) https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/enlightenment/
[https://perma.cc/AKN5-TWGN] .
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pecially if supported by evidence and arguments, will increase the prevalence of belief in untrue propositions dealing with the same subject.
The problem, however, is that there is scant reason, as a matter of empirical psychological and sociological fact, to believe that these assumptions are sound for all or even most populations. Although the large
amount of recent publicity given to so-called fake news has highlighted
the question,65 the fake news issue is in some sense distracting. Although
modern technology, including but not limited to the Internet and realistic-looking computer simulations, has made it easier to create and circulate flat-out falsehoods that are nevertheless widely accepted as true, the
phenomenon now re-labeled as “fake news” is hardly recent. Many people in recent years (and still) believe that Barack Obama was born in
Kenya, despite definitive evidence to the contrary,66 and so too with the
false beliefs that President George W. Bush knew in advance of the September 11 attacks,67 that the Holocaust did not occur,68 that AIDS is the
product of a government conspiracy,69 and that the predictions of astrology are reliable.70 Indeed, when P.T. Barnum is (erroneously) said to
have observed more than a century ago that “there’s a sucker born every
minute,”71 he simply encapsulated a phenomenon of gullibility that is as
widespread as it is old.72
65. See, e.g, James Carson, What Is Fake News? Its Origins and How It Grew in 2016,
THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 16, 2007), www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake-news-originsgrew-2016/ [https://perma.cc/5B6Z-BN79]; Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Stings and
Scams: “Fake News,” the First Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, Cornell Legal
Studies Research Paper 17-02, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906444; Sapna
Maheshwari, How Fake News Goes Viral: A Case Study, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/media/how-fake-news-spreads.html?_=0
[https://perma.cc/4FFW-LS2X].
66. See Jeff Zeleny, Persistent ‘Birthers’ Fringe Disorients Strategists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/us/politics/05zeleny.html [https://perma.cc/
V89S-PRWS]; Lymari Morales, Obama’s Birth Certificate Convinces Some, but not All,
Skeptics, GALLUP (May 13, 2011), www.gallup.com/poll/147530/Obama-Birth-CertificateCnvinces-Not-Skeptics.aspx [https://perma.cc/A64V-QKA2].
67. See Mark Jacobson, The Ground Zero Grassy Knoll: A New Generation of Conspiracy Theorists Is at Work on a Secret History of New York’s Most Terrible Day, N.Y.
MAGAZINE, (Mar. 27, 2006) at 28; PUBLIC POLICY POLLING, Obama’s Approval Steady
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2009/PPP_Release_National_923
1210.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ATE-8ZQV].
68. See Emma Green, The World Is Full of Holocaust Deniers, THE ATLANTIC (May
14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/the-world-is-full-ofholocaust-deniers/370870/ [https://perma.cc/LVE5-JXNS].
69. See CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, Aids Conspiracy, SOURCE WATCH
(Jan. 23, 2006), www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/AIDS_conspiracy [https://perma.cc/CT9N294T].
70. Linda Lyons, Paranormal Beliefs Come (Super)Naturally to Some, GALLUP (Nov.
1, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/19558/paranormal-beliefs-come-supernaturallysome.aspx [https://perma.cc/H975-R24D].
71. The phrase is accurate, but it was uttered not by Barnum but by one of his competitors. See NICHOLAS DIFONZO, THE WATERCOOLER EFFECT 124 (2008).
72. Indeed, gullibility may be but one corner of the larger phenomenon of motivated
reasoning, the widespread tendency of people to see the world and reason about it in light
of, and distorted by, the facts and outcomes they would, for fact-independent reasons prefer. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 489 (1990);
Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, On the Failure of Cognitive Ability to Predict My-
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More recently, controversies about climate change,73 the safety of genetically modified foods,74 and the alleged danger of immunization,75
among many others, have raised closely related issues. Although here the
questions are less about single falsifiable (and false) facts than about science and about the weight or consensus76 of scientific opinion, once again
the nature of the controversies casts doubt on the rationalist Enlightenment belief—as embodied in the perspectives of Milton, Mill, and their
successors—that truth has some intrinsic power or that humans have
some innate ability to identify truth and reject falsity. What we now
know, the rationalists and the Enlightenment unfortunately to the contrary, is that various attributes of a proposition other than its truth or
falsity often play a major role in determining whether that proposition
will be accepted or rejected.77
This longstanding and well-documented resilience of falsity in the face
of fact and reason has important implications for the question of collective knowledge. Most obviously, it suggests that the statement of a proposition may under some circumstances increase, as the numbers in my
hypothetical examples above suggest, both the number (and proportion)
side and One-Sided Thinking Biases, 14 THINKING AND REASONING 129 (2008); Keith E.
Stanovich & Richard F. West, Natural Myside Bias Is Independent of Cognitive Ability, 13
THINKING & REASONING 225 (2007); Keith E. Stanovich, Ricgard F. West, & Maggie E.
Toplak, Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCH. SCI. 259 (2013). A prominent legal application is Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme
Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems
for Constitutional Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011). But although Kahan and others (see,
e.g., Peter H. Ditto, David A. Pizzaro, & David Tannenbaum, Motivated Moral Reasoning,
50 PSYCH. LEARNING & MOTIVATION 307 (2009)) focus on moral or policy reasoning, it is
important, as the foregoing scholarship demonstrates, not to forget, especially in the context of the issues discussed here, that motivated reasoning pervades and infects reasoning
about verifiable fact as well as about less verifiable questions of philosophy, morality, and
public policy. On this last phenomenon, see Stephan Lewandowsky & Klaus Oberauer,
Motivated Rejection of Science, 25 CURRENT DIRECTION IN PSYCH. SCI. 217 (2016).
73. A useful and balanced, even if slightly dated, overview of some of the better and
more prominent books on more or less all sides of the issue is Andrew C. Revkin, Challenges to Both Left and Right on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2007), www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/science/earth/13book.html [https://perma.cc/KXR8-8E5W].
74. See Katherine Zeratsky, Genetically Modified Foods—Why the Controversy?
MAYO CLINIC NEWSLETTER (May 20, 2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/
nutrition-and-healthy-eating/expert-blog/genetically-modified-foods/bgp-20164720 [https://
perma.cc/FX36-GXJ5]. See also Sydney E. Scott, Yoel Inbar, & Paul Rozin, Evidence for
Absolute Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United States, 11 PERSP. ON
PSYCH. SCI. 315 (2016).
75. See History of Anti-vaccination Movements, COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF PHILADELPHIA, www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/history-anti-vaccination-movements
[https://perma.cc/FU4M-J4TN].
76. The very idea of a consensus, of course, raises issues about the proportion of some
group necessary to describe the group’s views as a consensus, as well as whether all members of the group count equally (or at all) in the question whether a consensus exists.
77. See Daniel T. Gilbert, Douglas S. Krull, & Patrick S. Malone, Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the Rejection of False Information, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCH. 601 (1990); Matthew E. Jacovina, Scott R. Hinze, & David N. Rapp, Fool
Me Twice: The Consequences of Reading (and Rereading) Inaccurate Information, 28 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 558 (2014); David N. Rapp, The Consequences of Reading Inaccurate Information, 25 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 281 (2016).
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of people who believe something that is in fact true and the number (and
proportion) of people who believe in the truth of something that is in fact
false. Obviously, if all members of some population have views about the
truth or falsity of some proposition, then an increase in those who believe
it true will decrease the number of those who believe it false. But in a
world in which the unaware or the undecided often represent an appreciable percentage of many populations on many issues, it is both theoretically and practically possible that discussion of (and freedom of speech
about) some proposition will increase both the number of those with the
true belief and the number with a false belief.
Although the recipients of messages may on occasion neither say nor
do anything as a result of receiving a message, it is reasonable to assume
that a recipient of a message will sometimes or often, as a result of receiving the message, say (or, of course, write, text, or whatever) something to
someone else, and the someone else will then, once removed from the
original message, either believe what she is told or disbelieve what she is
told, where again the extent of belief or disbelief will not be entirely a
function of the message received. And so on for some, presumably, considerable number of further iterations, each of which may well produce
further believers and disbelievers, some of whom will be correct and
some of whom will be mistaken.
All of the above is directed to shoring up the assumptions that support
the stylized examples in the previous section. When a speaker utters a
proposition that has a truth-value, some number of initial and subsequent
hearers will, as a result of the initial utterance, have some reaction to the
proposition uttered, and that reaction will, in some way, affect the beliefs
of the hearers about the truth of the proposition. For some hearers, the
utterance of the proposition will, as standard free speech theory supposes, cause them to reject their previously held false beliefs in favor of
true beliefs. But for some others, the utterance of the proposition may
well cause them to reject previously held true beliefs in favor of false
ones.78 For still others—the ones who previously had no beliefs on the
topic of the proposition—the utterance will cause some of them to have
78. If I may be forgiven for re-using a previously-published example, consider the scenario of Henry Fonda’s character—Davis—in the classic 1957 film 12 Angry Men. See
Schauer, supra note 60, at 137 n.28. As is well known, the Fonda character, one of twelve
jurors deliberating in a criminal case, eventually persuades his eleven fellow jurors to reject
their previous false belief in the defendant’s guilt for a (presumably, or so the film want us
to believe) true belief in the defendant’s possible innocence. But in engaging in his verbal
persuasion (speech), Fonda had at his disposal not only the seeming truth of what he was
saying, but also Fonda’s good looks, charm, persistence, rhetorical talents, passion, and
snappy white suit. But now consider a different scenario, in which the good looks, the
charm, the persistence, the passion, the rhetorical talent, and the suit are the same, but in
which the defendant was in fact guilty. The question is whether the same truth-independent
attributes of Fonda’s utterances might have persuaded eleven jurors to exchange a true
belief for a false one in the same way that in the film a false belief was exchanged for a true
one. The film being fiction, of course we cannot answer the question, but the mental experiment is nevertheless designed to focus attention on the possibility that in some or many
circumstances the truth-independent attributes of a speech act might cause some recipient
of that speech act to reach a conclusion—have a belief—contrary to the actual truth.
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true beliefs where previously they had no beliefs, but for some of those
who previously had no beliefs, the utterance will cause them to have false
beliefs where previously they had no beliefs. Moreover, all four of these
possibilities—true beliefs to false beliefs, false beliefs to true beliefs, no
beliefs to true beliefs, and no beliefs to false beliefs—will exist when the
proposition uttered is true, and also when it is false. A strong irrationalist
might say that the truth of the proposition has no causal effect on the
likelihood of its adoption, but I make no such claim here. Rather, I claim
only and more cautiously that all of these possibilities will exist for both
true and false propositions, and that that is so even if, as the rationalist
would insist, some of the possibilities are more likely for true propositions than for false ones.
Thus, if we are thinking about the array of beliefs within a population—the issue of collective belief, or collective knowledge—the basic
claim here is that the utterance of any proposition is likely to change the
array of individuals holding both true and false beliefs, and what we know
from serious psychology79 and a vast amount of anecdotal evidence is
that there is no reason to suppose that the change will be exclusively in
the direction of more true belief. Even if, as the rationalist supposes, the
weight of the change is in the direction of truth, as long as this is not the
case for every individual on every proposition the point of the examples
in the previous section still holds, and the problem then turns to that of
determining the consequences of this complex shift in beliefs for some
collectivity.
V. A CALCULUS OF CONSEQUENCES
None of the above conclusions and complications about collective
knowledge and the complexities of group belief would make much of a
difference if it were the case that belief was inert.80 If there are no or few
consequences apart from belief for its own sake whether people have true
beliefs or false ones, then any shift in a population’s array of true and
false beliefs would be of little interest or importance. If I change my belief in the superiority of chocolate ice cream over vanilla to the opposite,
virtually nothing about the world will be affected.81 But of course there is
no reason to accept this premise for most beliefs about most subjects.
People who believe that Alvarez actually was awarded the Medal of
Honor even if he was not may well be more likely to vote for him than
otherwise,82 and if enough of them do so then the likelihood that a
79. See supra notes 34, 72.
80. On the relationship between belief and action, and for the implications of that
relationship for thinking about freedom of thought and freedom of speech, see Frederick
Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427 (2015).
81. I set aside the possibility that changes in preferences for ice cream flavors would
have marketing and production implications, especially if the suppliers and manufacturing
methods are different for chocolate than for vanilla.
82. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). There is no evidence that Congress was motivated by such concerns in enacting the Stolen Vair Act. Much more likely, as
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fabricator will hold office increases, a consequence we can assume, all
other things being equal,83 is for the worse.
Many contemporary debates reinforce the same point. If people believe that climate change is either non-existent or not substantially the
product of human acts, and if those beliefs are false, then policies that
would lessen the degree of human-created climate change are less likely
to be adopted, and the consequences of climate change increased.84 If
people believe that immunization is harmful, and if that belief is false,
then some number of children will contract diseases they would otherwise
not have contracted.85 If people believe that genetically modified foods
are unsafe, and if the truth is to the contrary,86 then there may be less
development of healthy or lower-cost genetically modified foods than
would otherwise be the case. If people believe that a substance made
from apricot pits can cure cancer,87 or that garlic rubs can cure AIDS,88
they may well forego medically established treatments and suffer accordingly. If people believe that the Holocaust did not occur or has been substantially exaggerated, the believers may be more inclined towards antiSemitic acts than otherwise,89 and if people falsely believe (or believed)
that Barack Obama was not eligible to be President because of his foreign birth, they might be less inclined to engage in some number of obedient or prosocial acts than otherwise, to the detriment of the common
good.
In some sense the examples in the previous paragraph should not have
been necessary. It seems hardly controversial that false beliefs can have
bad consequences.90 But if we combine this seemingly obvious proposithe title of the law indicates, was simply a desire not to tarnish the dignity of the honor (or
the honoree) and not to dilute the value of the honor by empowering suggestions about
whether the honor was actually earned.
83. The qualification is important. The proclivity (or not) to lie is but one attribute of a
holder of public office, and I make no claim here that it is the only desirable attribute, or
that other desirable attributes might on some occasions or for some office-holders outweigh the undesirable attribute of a proclivity to fabrication.
84. See supra note 73.
85. See supra note 75.
86. See supra note 74.
87. See Arnold Relman, Closing the Books on Laetrile, 306 N.E.J. MED. 236 (1982). It
is worth noting that Laetrile, which had no verified benefits but many verified dangers,
continued to be unlawfully distributed presumably in response to consumer demand, almost a quarter of a century after its medical benefits were definitively established as nonexistent. See Slingluff v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 2006-Ohio-3556.
88. See South Africa’s Health Minister Advocates Treating AIDS with Lemon, Beetroot
and Garlic, DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 20, 2006), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article401485/South-Africas-health-minister-advocates-treating-AIDS-lemon-beetroot-garlic
.html [https://perma.cc/ZR8V-H5XT].
89. See generally GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas
Hochmann eds., 2011).
90. For some time free speech theory and discourse was dominated by the view that
speech was largely harmless, or was, as a category, less harmful than non-speech conduct,
and was thus protected, in part, for that reason. See Sarah Sorial, Sedition and the Advocacy of Violence: Free Speech and Counter-Terrorism 18 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST.
431(2012) (discussing but not endorsing the “lesser harm” hypothesis). Alternatively, more
sophisticated commentators acknowledged the harm that speech might produce, but ar-
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tion with the argument in the previous section, things become more complex. More specifically, it appears that uttering propositions with truth
value to a population will, in many instances, produce more individuals
within that population who hold beliefs on some topic or proposition than
was the case prior to the utterance, more individuals who hold true beliefs within that population than was the case prior to the utterance, but
also more individuals who hold false beliefs within that population than
was the case prior to the utterance.91 The stylized example above of a
population of 100 which went from twenty people holding true beliefs to
forty, from seventy with no beliefs down to thirty, and with thirty people
holding false beliefs up from ten, was designed to add hypothetical numbers to the dynamic that was just described.
Obviously, the numbers I have selected are not only hypothetical but
also arbitrary, and equally obviously, the actual numbers will vary with
the nature of the proposition,92 the nature of the prior beliefs of the
members of the population, the frequency and method of utterance, and
much else, as discussed above. But as long as there remains the possibility
of at least some increase in the number of people holding false beliefs as
a result of the utterance of some proposition, and as long as the holding
of false beliefs can have negative consequences, it is now clear that the
utterance of a proposition will not necessarily be for the better, and that
is so even if the utterance produces an increase in the number of members of the population holding true beliefs after the utterance. And thus,
even if Mill’s rationalistic suppositions are sound, his conclusions are
sound only under the assumption that a society in which more people
hold true beliefs than hold false beliefs is for the better, independent of
the consequences of the false beliefs. But we can now see that there is
little reason to accept this assumption.
The conclusion from the foregoing analysis is twofold. First, it is impossible to make a determination about the consequences of a factual uttergued that it was harm of a certain indirect or otherwise more complex form, thus immunizing even most harmful speech from control. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free
Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979 (1997). But although more recent scholarship has been
more willing to recognize the harm that speech may cause, see CATHARINE MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS (1993); Susan Brison, Speech and Other Acts, 10 LEGAL THEORY 261 (2004);
Susan J. Brison, Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 4 LEGAL THEORY 39 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (2011); Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and
Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993), that scholarship has focused, often in so-called hate speech
contexts, on the harms of epithets, insults, and advocacy, and only rarely on the harms of
falsity as such. One way of understanding this Article is as the beginnings of an attempt to
remedy what appears to be a gap in the existing literature in this regard.
91. See supra note 74.
92. In Va. State Board of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763 n.24 (1976) (hereinafter Virginia Pharmacy), the Supreme Court noted the “common
sense differences” between commercial and non-commercial propositions. The Court likely
misidentified those differences in Virginia Pharmacy, erroneously believing that market
forces would give commercial speech greater hardiness than ideological speech, but the
Court was still correct in its assumption that the dynamics of speech would vary with the
nature of the proposition.
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ance without knowing both the array of true and false beliefs that the
utterance of some proposition will produce; and, second, that even knowing the array of produced true and false beliefs will be insufficient to determine whether the utterance is for the better or for the worse without
also knowing the consequences flowing from the false beliefs.93
It is important to recognize, however, that even knowledge of the expected harm and expected benefits94 of some utterance will not answer
the free speech question. The essence of free speech (and First Amendment) protection is categorial,95 in the sense that the question is not
whether this or that utterance will produce more good than harm, or
more harm than good. Rather, it is whether some rule that protects (or
does not protect) some category of utterances will, when applied to all of
the utterances within the category, be for the better.96
VI. CONCLUSION
My goal in this Article has not been to even attempt to specify which
First Amendment rule or rules should be adopted, whether about collective knowledge or about anything else. That is especially so given that the
analysis here takes place entirely within a set of search for truth/marketplace of ideas justifications for freedom of speech, a set of justifications
that has not fared well when subject to close analytical and empirical
scrutiny,97 however popular it may be with the Supreme Court, with
other courts, and in civil liberties advocacy and rhetoric. Moreover, even
to the extent that the search for truth survives as a legitimate justification
for freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry, either generally or in more
discrete settings, it most often appears alongside other justifications,
rather than standing entirely alone.98
For all of these problems, however, the search for truth has demonstrated a remarkable resilience for both the courts and the commentators
in thinking about the purposes that a principle of freedom of speech is
designed to serve, and the goals that the First Amendment is plausibly
understood to further. And as long as the search for truth persists in the
constitutional doctrine and the scholarly commentary,99 it is important to
understand just what it means for a society to search for truth and what it
93. Indeed, the optimal analysis should be informed by data not only on the consequences of false beliefs, which may occasionally be for the better, but also on the consequences of true beliefs, which may occasionally be for the worse.
94. I use “expected harm” and “expected benefits” in the statistician’s sense of the
magnitude of the consequences multiplied by the probability of their occurrence.
95. “Categorial,” referring to categories, and not “categorical,” which suggests
absoluteness.
96. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1 (1989).
97. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
98. On First Amendment doctrine as possibly (probably?) emerging not from any single foundational justification but instead from a combination of multiple justifications, see
Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 645 (1980).
99. See supra notes 2–5.
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is for a society to have found it. But if we are thinking about the search
for truth as a societal and not an individual goal,100 then we cannot avoid
examining more closely than the traditional thinking about freedom of
speech, Mill included, has examined the question of how a society can
find truth in the aggregate, what it is for a society to know something, and
why determining what a society knows may not be as simple as adding up
what each of the constituent members of that society know as individuals.

100. But see Blasi, supra note 62, understanding Mill as aiming far more toward the
development of individual intellectual character than at social knowledge.

